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C HANGES in the market for information pose challenges to financial
regulation by disrupting settled distinctions on which financial regulation
depends. in some cases, these distinctions are based on explicit or implicit
understandings of technological conditions. In other cases, the distinctions are
based on factors independent of the state of technology.
This article argues that regulatory distinctions based on implicit understandings
of technological conditions should be revised as the technology changes. When
rules are based on factors other than the state of technology, they should be
reviewed to ensure that technological change does not affect their application.
Significantly, regulators should not assume that investors will experience
information online in the same way that they experience information offline.
This article is divided into five main parts. Part H provides background on the
role that information plays in the financial markets. Part III discusses the explicit
and implicit understandings of technological conditions in regulation. Next, the
article examines three regulatory distinctions that are challenged by technological
development. Specifically, Part IV examines and compares traditional news sources
and regulated investment publications. Then, Part V discusses and contrasts
professional and non-professional market participants. Last, Part VI discusses the
differences between sophisticated and non-sophisticated market participants.'
Legal rules rely on definitions to determine whether and how people are
regulated. Investment advisers are regulated by financial regulators, but newspapers
are not. However, distinguishing between news and investment advice is
increasingly difficult online. When social practices of different groups converge
in this way, regulators should not insist on maintaining the old regulatory
* C Caroline Bradley 2006. All rights reserved. Professor of Law, University of Miami School
of Law, P.O. Box 248087, Coral Gables, FL 33124, cbradley@law.miami.edu. I would like to
acknowledge the University of Miami School of Law's support for the writing of this article, and to
thank the participants in the conference for the Tenth Anniversary of Cybersecurities Law and in a
seminar at the Oxford Information Institute for their helpful comments on earlier versions. Special
thanks to Michael Froomkin (as always) and to Dimity Kingsford-Smith.
1, In this article, I focus on examples of challenges to securities regulation rather than to the
regulation of banking and insurance. There are other issues in securities regulation not examined here,
such as online shareholder communications and internet stock offerings. Banking and insurance
regulation also raise similar issues. For example, in banking and insurance, the questions of where
consumers acquire information about banking and insurance services and how they process that
information are similar to the issues about information gathering and processing identified in this
article. Many of the important issues in financial regulation concern the way that the Internet loosens
links between firms and transactions and local geography, whereas law is territorial. These issues are
also beyond this article's scope.
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distinctions. Although professional market participants may be regulated, and non-
professional investors do not need to be, easy and cheaper access to trading
resources online means distinguishing between professional and non-professional
market participants is harder. Regulatory regimes commonly recognise that
unsophisticated investors need more protection than sophisticated market
participants. But online, the vulnerable may feel that they are in fact sophisticated
and empowered.
These different regulatory distinctions, used as criteria for the application of
regulatory requirements, affect the conditions of competition in the financial
markets. Specifically, regulation imposes costs on those who are regulated, and
these costs may be passed along to consumers of services provided by regulated
firms. As a result, regulated investment advice may be more expensive, but perhaps
no more useful, than information from an unregulated source of information.
Regulatory costs and onerous regulatory requirements can also operate as barriers
to entry. For example, if a professional market participant is required to comply
with training and licensing requirements that do not apply to non-professionals, then
the definition of who is a "professional" operates as a barrier to entry.2
Significantly, "professional" activities are foreclosed to those who do not meet the
training and licensing requirements. Regulatory costs may be justified if they are
necessary to address market failures, but not where they impede competition that
would operate in investors' interests.3
Initially, some commentators celebrated the disruptive potential of the Internet;
in economic as well as political terms. The Internet would allow for cheap speech,4
and cheap transactions. 5 Ordinary investors would be empowered by easier access
to investment information and by increased competition between financial services
providers.6 As of 2005, it is not clear that the disruptive potential of the internet has
been realized. Firms and regulators have acted to minimize disruption. Regulators
argue that online investors require regulatory protection to guard against their
vulnerability, even where the investors do not acknowledge that they need
2. See, e.g., Conrad S. Ciccotello, C. Terry Grant & Mark Dickie, Will Consult for Food!
Rethinking Barriers to Professional Entry in the Information Age, 40 AM. Bus. L.J. 905, 911 (2003)
("Traditionally, professional institutions were protected quite well from competition by regulation.").
3. Public choice theorists argue that regulations are commonly promoted by those who will
obtain rents as a result of the regulations. Life tends to be more complicated than this. See, e.g., Sam
Peltzman, The Economic Theory of Regulation after a Decade of Deregulation, BROOKINGS PAPERS
ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, MICROECONOMICS 1, 10 (Martin Neil Baily & Clifford Winston eds., 1989)
(discussing the idea that "[g]iven the usual constraints on discrimination, regulators will allocate
benefits across consumer and producer groups so that total political utility is maximized").
4. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What it Will Do, 104 YALE L.J. 1805, 1807
(1995) ("Cheap speech will mean that far more speakers-rich and poor, popular and not, banal and
avant garde-will be able to make their work available to all.").
5. See, e.g., ANDREW D. KLEIN, WALLSTREET.COM: FAT CAT INVESTING AT THE CLICK OF A
MOUSE 6 (1998).
6. See, e.g., Arthur Levitt, Chairman, Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC), Plain Talk
About On-line Investing, Speech at the National Press Club (May 4, 1999), available at




regulatory protection.7 Traditional offline businesses have taken advantage of
online channels of communication and trading, fending off much of the threatened
competition from new online challengers.
I. INFORMATION AND FINANCIAL MARKETS
Information is central to the functioning of financial markets because these
markets exist to price risk. Financial regulation reflects this fact by mandating and
controlling disclosures to prospective investors in three ways. First, by controlling
who is allowed to make claims about expertise in financial information; second, by
requiring the publication of market prices for securities; and, third, by prohibiting
fiduciaries from trading on the basis of inside information. Whether or not the
market in any particular security is efficient,8 market participants routinely behave
as though information is useful for making investment decisions.
In the recent past, professional investors had access to information which was not
generally available to investors at large. In the days before Regulation FD, issuers
and their advisors would commonly discuss financial information with analysts and
others who might influence the market well before they revealed the same
information to the market in general.9 Now that investors have the same access to
information as professionals, it may be difficult for them to sort between more and
less useful information.' 0
One criterion which regulators have used to distinguish between unsophisticated
investors, who are entitled to greater regulatory protection, and sophisticated
investors, who may get less protection, is the amount of information or the level of
access to information the investor possesses. 1 Today, investors have access to
large amounts of information from a wider variety of sources than ever before.
Investors can now obtain information about investments and investment strategies
through print and broadcast media, in person through investment seminars, and
online through financial portals, broker-dealer web sites, and chat rooms. In the
United States, filings of public companies are available online at no charge. 2
Exchange and non-exchange markets publish trade data and other information.
Although many operators of online financial information resources are regulated
7. Id.
8. See, e.g., Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, The Capital Asset Pricing Model: Theory
and Evidence, 18 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES, Summer 2004, at 25.
9. See, e.g., Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,715, 51,716 (Aug. 24,
2000) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 243) ("[W]e have become increasingly concerned about the selective
disclosure of material information by issuers. As reflected in recent publicized reports, many issuers
are disclosing important nonpublic information, such as advance warnings of earnings results, to
securities analysts or selected institutional investors or both, before making full disclosure of the same
information to the general public. Where this has happened, those who were privy to the information
beforehand were able to make a profit or avoid a loss at the expense of those kept in the dark.").
10. But see, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Coase's Penguin, or, Linux and the Theory of the Firm, 112
YALE L.J. 369, 390-96 (2002) (describing various online mechanisms for ensuring relevance and
accreditation of online information).
11. See, e.g., C. Edward Fletcher, III, Sophisticated Investors under the Federal Securities Laws,
1988 DUKE L.J. 1081, 1083.
12. See SEC, Filings and Forms, http://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml (last visited Sept. 19, 2005).
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firms or traditional information businesses, anyone can publish their views about
investments through email or chat rooms.' 3 In addition, investors can now obtain
hard information about issuers of securities and economic trends through multiple
channels. Many of these channels did not exist until relatively recently, and those
that did were prohibitively expensive for non-professional investors. 4 Investors can
also benefit from different opinions about individual securities, issuers, and about
market trends. Regulators should respond to this leveling of the informational
playing field by shifting their emphasis to the question of whether an investor is
capable of making effective use of the available information.
As a result of these changes in the information market, regulators need to address
a number of different questions. First, what they can do to help investors manage
and sort through the enormously increased volume of available information.
Second, regulators should study whether investors experience information they
receive through various channels differently."' Third, regulators should consider
whether they need to take action in relation to markets in new kinds of information.
Increasingly, not only is technology being used to give investors information about
what investments to make, but more generally, what investment strategies they
should use. Information about investments and investment strategies takes new
forms as firms develop software programmes and courses on and off-line that are
designed to teach people how to invest. Other computer programmes apply
algorithms to match up those who wish to buy and sell investments, thereby
eliminating the need for any direct human intervention.'
6
Firms can make money from selling investment-oriented publications and
seminars. However, investor training programmes are not regulated in the same
way as traditional advice from broker-dealers. If the programmes are part of a
broker-dealer's advertising strategy, then they will be covered by the broker's Self
Regulatory Organization's (SRO's) rules on advertising. 7 If the programmes are
not part of the broker-dealer's strategy, they may be effectively unregulated. Also,
at a time when regulators sponsor investor education programmes," it may be
difficult for investors to distinguish between different offerings, except that
13. A number of recent trading suspensions have involved suggestions that span email was used
to tout shares. See, e.g., Courtside Products Inc. Order of Suspension of Trading, 70 Fed. Reg. 5258
(Feb. 1, 2005) (suspending securities because of a possible unlawful distribution involving failure to
comply with resale restrictions under Regulation D, and the issuer was the subject of spam email
touting its shares).
14. Levitt, supra note 6.
15. See, e.g., Caroline Bradley, Online Financial Information: Law and Technological Change,
26 J.L. & POL'Y 375 (2004) (suggesting that regulators should take account of 3 Is of Internet
information: immediacy, interactivity, and interjurisdictionality).
16. See, e.g., Press Release, Int'l Swaps & Derivatives Ass'n (ISDA), Automation of Processing
in Privately Negotiated Derivatives Accelerates, Says ISDA: Credit Derivatives Lead the Way (Mar.
16, 2005), available at http://www.isda.org/press/pressprocessingsurvey03-16-05.html.
17. See, e.g., New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), Communications with the Public, Rule
472(a)(1), available at http://rules.nyse.com/NYSE/NYSERuIes/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2005).
18. See, e.g., Financial Literacy & Educ. Comm'n, Investor Information,
http://www.mymoney.gov/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2005); SEC, Investor Education and Assistance,
http://www.sec.gov/investor.shtml (last visited Sept. 19,2005) ("We cannot tell you what investments
to make, but we can tell you how to invest wisely and avoid fraud.").
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regulator-sponsored programmes emphasise conservative strategies and non-
regulator-sponsored programmes promise empowerment and excitement. This
difference is problematic. Although adopting speculative investment strategies
would be rational for some investors, if not for others, 9 regulators are criticised if
they advocate particular strategies.2"
III. EXPLICIT AND IMPLICIT UNDERSTANDINGS OF
TECHNOLOGICAL CONDITIONS IN REGULATION
Some legal rules rely on explicit understandings of technological conditions.
Rules that require disclosures to be made in written documents must be adjusted for
the online environment. The regulator must consider whether e-mailed or web-
published documents are equivalent to paper documents. Consumer-focused
disclosure requirements that require information to be published using specific font
sizes do not work in an online environment where the reader, not the publisher,
controls how the reader sees the text. How the regulator should adjust the rule may
not always be obvious or uncontroversial, and market participants may lobby for the
result they want. But in these cases, the fact that the rule is based on an explicit
understanding of technology is clear and uncontroversial.
Even where the language of a rule shows that it is based on an explicit
understanding of technological conditions, technological change raises issues for
regulation that may be less obvious and more complex than those on which
regulators focus initially. In the past, securities markets had a clear physical
location, whether in coffeehouses2 or on a sidewalk.22 Statutory definitions of
exchanges reflected this reality and referred to physical marketplaces.23 When
regulators were faced with a new reality where it was possible for financial markets
to operate with no physical trading floor, they had to decide whether the existence
of a physical marketplace was critical to the nature of the exchange.24 Although an
19. Cf Edward J. McCaffery, Why People Play Lotteries and Why It Matters, 1994 WiSC. L. REV.
71, 74 (1994) ("[Cjonsumers desire large amounts of sudden wealth, and lotteries offer a unique
opportunity to satisfy such desires.").
20. See, e.g., Henry T.C. Hu, Faith and Magic: Investor Beliefs and Government Neutrality, 78
TEX. L. REV. 777, 837-38 (2000).
21. See, e.g., 1 DAVID KYNASTON, THE CrrY OF LONDON 16 (1994) (noting the London Stock
Exchange's origins in the coffee houses of Change Alley).
22. American Stock & Options Exchange (AMEX) was originally known as the Curb Exchange
because of its physical location. ROBERT SOBEL, AMEX: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN STOCK
EXCHANGE, 1921-1971, at xv (1972).
23. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 defines an exchange as"any organization, association,
or group of persons ... which constitutes, maintains, or provides a market place or facilities for
bringing together purchasers and sellers of securities or for otherwise performing with respect to
securities the functions commonly performed by a stock exchange as that term is generally
understood." See Security Exchange Act of 1934, § 3(a)(l), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(1) (2000).
24. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-16(a) (2005). Cf Therese H. Maynard, What is an
"Exchange? "-Proprietary Electronic Securities Trading Systems and the Statutory Definition ofan
Exchange, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 833, 876-82 (1992) (critiquing the SEC's use of no-action letters
to define exchanges in ways inconsistent with the statutory language). The National Securities Markets
Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, granted the SEC a general exemptive authority under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 15 U.S.C. § 78mm ("[Tjhe Commission, by rule, regulation, or
Winter 2006]
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exchange market can function without a trading floor, and software may match
orders more efficiently than people can, self-regulation may work differently in
market environments where the participants never have to meet, as opposed to
environments where the participants are conscious of belonging to a club composed
of real people. This is not meant to suggest that self-regulation in markets where
the participants never meet is necessarily less effective than in markets where the
participants do meet.25  Rather, self-regulation is likely to work differently in
different contexts. Mitchel Abolafia compares the views of participants in
impersonal bond markets with those of participants in the personalized NYSE as
follows:
Traders sit in a room full of other traders transacting with the market through the
telephone and computer networks. Said another trader, "I don't really feel like I can
rely on anybody here. That's the way this business is. You've got to rely on yourself."
Such statements define both actors and action. They describe an impersonal
environment in which trust and co-operation are nearly absent. This is in noted contrast
to traders at the New York Stock Exchange where traders transact face to face and talk
about trust and building relationships with customers.26
Other studies suggest that effective norms can develop within communities of
people bound together by common interests; for example, by shared religious
beliefs.27 However, the extent to which the sort of real-world trust relationships that
produce effective norms will translate to virtual communities is unclear.28
Even where the language of a rule shows that it is based on a particular
assumption about technology, and regulators know that they need to think about the
underlying basis for the rule in order to apply it in changed conditions, the regulator
may not immediately think about all of the implications of the change. But a wide
order, may conditionally or unconditionally exempt any person, security, or transaction, or any class
or classes of persons, securities, or transactions, from any provision or provisions of this title or of any
rule or regulation thereunder, to the extent that such exemption is necessary or appropriate in the public
interest, and is consistent with the protection of investors.").
25. After all, market participants may be more likely to engage in collusive behavior if they know
those with whom they are colluding. Cf Barak Richman, A Theory of Private Ordering, 104 COLUM.
L. REv. 2328,2347 (2004), available at http://eprints.law.duke.edu/archive/00001119/01/104__Colum.
_L. Rev. 2328_(2004).pdf ("Another cost associated with the relational contracting and reputation
mechanisms that support private ordering is the potential for collusive behavior.").
26. Mitchel Y. Abolafia, Markets as Cultures: An Ethnographic Approach, in THE LAWS OF THE
MARKETS 69, 72 (Michel Callon ed., 1998).
27. See, e.g., Barak Richman, Community Enforcement oflnformal Contracts: Jewish Diamond
Merchants in New York (The Harvard John M. Olin Discussion Paper Series No. 384 (2002)),
available at http://eprints.law.duke.edu/archive/00000814/01/Harvard OlinCtr 384.pdf.
28. Many scholars who write about trust in electronic environments focus on issues such as trust
in e-commerce and trust in personal relationships rather than on how trust in these environments may
affect the ability of virtual communities to generate and apply norms. See, e.g., Kari Chopra &
William A. Wallace, Trust in Electronic Environments, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 36TH HAWAII
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SYSTEM SCIENCES (2003), available at
http://csdl2.computer.org/comp/proceedings/hicss/2003/1874/09/187490331 a.pdf. For a discussion
of standards generation on the Internet, see, e.g., A. Michael Froomkin, Habermas@discourse.net:
Toward a Critical Theory of Cyberspace, 116 HARV. L. REV. 749, 798-805 (2003).
[Vol. 37
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range of rules is based on implicit, rather than explicit, understandings of
technological conditions. Changes in technology allow new ways of doing business
which challenge existing rules obliquely. For example, rules that apply to activities
undertaken within a particular geographic territory do not apply as easily where
technological developments facilitate the moving of those activities offshore.29
When firms begin to take advantage of these new ways of doing business, policy
makers must consider whether and how they should react to the implications of the
changes. Offshoring may reduce the costs of doing business, but it may also involve
new risks that financial regulators must consider and urge firms to guard against.3"
Technological changes may reduce transaction costs, as in the case of offshoring,
and economic barriers to entry. But legal rules also impose transaction costs and
may create barriers to entry. If regulators maintain old rules despite changed
conditions, they may protect monopoly positions in ways that harm consumers'
interests.
While technological changes may empower investors by increasing competition
between service providers, they may also highlight and increase investors'
vulnerabilities. In addition, regulators who are responsible for enforcing the
securities laws are constantly reminded that many investors are hopeful to the point
of being gullible.3' Significantly, behavioral economists suggest that investors are
generally affected by biases that interfere with their ability to make rational
investment decisions.32 Regulators adopt mixed strategies of enforcing regulations
against firms that take advantage of vulnerable investors and of publishing advice
for investors;33 however, whether the regulators' advice reaches the people who
need it most is not clear.
Many of the rules that securities regulators administer seek to ensure that
investors receive information about issuers of securities. Increasingly, issuers of
securities use their web sites to communicate with potential and actual investors.
Consequently, regulators have adjusted their approaches to disclosure
29. See, e.g., Peltzman, supra note 3, at 34 (describing how the development of the Eurodollar
market undermined U.S. authorities' ability to regulate dollar interest rates).
30. The Bank for International Settlements (BIS), International Organization of Securities
Commissions (IOSCO) and the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) have
together addressed the issue of whether and how offshoring may increase a financial institution's
operational risks. See THEJOINTFORUM, OUTSOURCINGINFINANCIAL SERVICES (Feb. 2005), available
at http://www.bis.org/publ/joint l2.pdf.
31. Regulators consistently warn investors that ifsomething sounds too good to be true, it usually
is. See, e.g., U.S. See. & Exch. Comm'n (SEC), Invest Wisely: Advice From Your Securities Industry
Regulators, available at http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/inws.htm; N. Am. Secs. Adm'rs Assoc.
(NASAA), NASAA's 2005 Top 10 Threats to Investors (Mar. 24, 2005),
http://www.nasaa.org/nasaanewsroom/current-nasaa-headlines/2719.cfin.
32. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock Markets: A
Behavioral Approach to Securities Regulation, 97 Nw. U.L. REV. 135, 143-48 (2002) (explaining the
field of "behavioral finance").
33. In July 2005, the SEC announced enforcement action against a firm that had promoted "auto-
trading" and, at the same time, issued an investor alert. See Press Release, SEC, SEC Sues Online
Adviser for Conduct Involving "Auto-Trading" (July 1, 2005), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2005-98.htm; SEC, All About Auto-Trading, available at
http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/autotrading.htm (last visited Sept. 19, 2005).
Winter 2006]
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requirements.34  However, adjusting disclosure requirements to new
communications practices requires more than liberalizing the rules so that issuers
can merely make the prospectus available online instead of sending out large
numbers of physical copies. If people experience e-mailed or web-based
information differently from hard copy information, disclosures made through
e-mail or web pages may not be functionally equivalent to paper-based
disclosures.35 On the Internet, publishers can use techniques that are not available
offline. Specifically, they can use sounds and animation to attract readers' attention
to particular material.36 Some of these techniques may be self-regulating if they
irritate potential investors. 37 Other attention-getting strategies may not be self-
regulating.
From the reader's perspective, online information may be different from offline
information in ways that regulators should consider. Cyberpsychologists suggest
using the Internet to obtain information may promote "nonlinearity in the
exploration of knowledge" and "communication via impressions rather than logical
connections., 3' An investor who relies on impressions and explores information in
a non-linear way would differ from securities law's model of a rational, reasonable
investor who invests based on relevant factual information.39
34. See, e.g., Press Release, SEC, SEC Votes to Adopt Securities Act Rule Reform and Shell
Company Regulations; Considers Matters Remanded by Court of Appeals (July 1, 2005), available
at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2005-99.htm; Securities Offering Reform, 70 Fed. Reg. 44, 722
(Aug. 3, 2005); Securities Offering Reform, 69 Fed. Reg. 67,392 (proposed Nov. 17, 2004).
35. Julie Williams of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency has recently suggested that
there is a more general issue of whether disclosure requirements really achieve their objective. See,
e.g., Julie L. Williams, Acting Comptroller of the Currency, Remarks Before Women in Housing and
Finance and The Exchequer Club 5 (Jan. 12, 2005), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/
2005-1a.pdf ("Let'sjust admit that we can't throw a bunch of lawyers-however talented-into a room
and expect that they are going to come up with consumer disclosures that are understandable to most
people. There's a critical element that's been missing from our consumer disclosure rulemaking
processes-testing how consumers interpret particular disclosures and how to make disclosures usable
to them. And we also need to think about how we can build in periodic reviews to determine if the
disclosures are still desired and effective.").
36. See, e.g., Weiyin Hong et al., Does Animation Attract Online Users'Attention? The Effects
of Flash on Information Search Performance and Perceptions, 15 INFO. SYS. REs. 60,61 (Mar. 2004)
("A major reason for using animation is to attract users' attention.").
37. See, e.g., id. at 77. The authors note that flash animation can interfere with focused attention
and may irritate readers as a result; therefore, they suggestthat web designers should "be conservative"
in their use of flash. Id.
38. Luciano Gamberini & Stefano Bussolon, Human Navigation in Electronic Environments, 4
CYBERPSYCHOLOGY & BEHAV. 57, 59 (2001).
39. Securities law gives investors remedies with respect to materially misleading information and
material omissions. In assessing whether omitted information was material, courts will assess whether
a reasonable investor would have considered the information to be significant. See, e.g., TSC
Industries, Inc. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) ("The general standard of materiality that we
think best comports with the policies of Rule 14a-9 is as follows: An omitted fact is material if there
is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how
to vote.... What the standard does contemplate is a showing of a substantial likelihood that, under all
the circumstances, the omitted fact would have assumed actual significance in the deliberations of the
reasonable shareholder. Put another way, there must be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of
the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the
"total mix" of information made available."); In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 867 A.2d 904, 940
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One major function of disclosure requirements is to enable prospective investors
to evaluate the risks of possible investments. People assess risk in different ways
in different circumstances. Sometimes, people assess risk analytically; at other
times, they assess risk intuitively.4" People generally combine rational analysis and
affect in assessing risk.41 Even professional traders in the financial markets are
affected by their emotions when they trade.4" Moreover, the most successful traders
seem to trade on intuition.43
Affective reactions can be manipulated." Some investors may be encouraged by
advertising campaigns to engage in risky investment strategies. In particular, online
investors may be over-confident,45 and they may be especially vulnerable to being
manipulated. When investors are manipulated into abandoning rational analysis,
they may be excluded from obtaining remedies under the securities laws on the
theory that rational investors would not have been affected by misleading
information provided to the market. Changing patterns of decision-making by
investors may require revisiting the assumption that only rational investors deserve
46statutory protections.
(Del. Ch. 2004) ("The only principled manner in which to hold a defendant liable in any of these
contexts is to evaluate the information in his possession, compare it to what the market knew, and
identify if any of the non-disclosed information would have been of consequence to a rational investor,
in light of the total mix of public information.").
40. See, e.g., Paul Slovic et al., Risk as Analysis and Risk as Feelings: Some Thoughts about
Affect, Reason, Risk and Rationality, 24 RISK ANALYSIS 311, 313 (2004).
41. See, e.g., id. at 314.
42. See, e.g., Andrew W. Lo & Dmitry V. Repin, The Psychophysiology ofReal-Time Financial
Risk Processing, 14 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 323, 332 (2002) ("Our findings suggest that
emotional responses are a significant factor in the real-time processing of financial risks. Contrary to
the common belief that emotions have no place in rational financial decision-making processes,
physiological variables associated with the ANS exhibit significant changes during market events even
for highly experienced professional traders. Moreover, the response patterns among variables and
events differed in important ways for less experienced traders-mean autonomic responses were
significantly higher-suggesting the possibility of relating trading skills to certain physiological
characteristics that can be measured."). Lo and Repin studied "10 professional traders employed by
the foreign-exchange and interest-rate derivatives business unit of a major global financial institution
based in Boston, MA." Id. at 325.
43. Id. at 332 ("[Tjhe most successful traders seem to trade based on their intuition about price
swings and market dynamics, often without the ability (or the need) to articulate a precise quantitative
algorithm for making these complex decisions. Their intuitive trading 'rules' are based on the
associations and relations between various information tokens that are formed on a subconscious level,
and our findings, and those in the extant cognitive sciences literature, suggest that decisions based on
the intuitivejudgments require not only cognitive but also emotional mechanisms.") (citation omitted).
44. See, e.g., Slovic et al., supra note 40, at 319. A consciousness of the risk that affective
reactions might interfere with rational decision-making is illustrated by the SEC's traditional approach
of controlling gun-jumping in the period before publication of a prospectus. But see Securities
Offering Reform, 70 Fed. Reg. 44,722,44,731 (Aug. 3,2005) (noting that"the gun-jumping provisions
of the Securities Act impose substantial and increasingly unworkable restrictions on many
communications that would be beneficial to investors and markets").
45. See, e.g., Brad M. Barber & Terrance Odean, Online Investors: Do the Slow Die First?, 15
REV. OF FiN. STUD. 455, 456 (2002).
46. See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 32. Cf Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral
Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1, 5 (2003) (suggesting that it may not be possible to
protect irrational investors through regulation).
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IV. TRADITIONAL NEWS SOURCES AND REGULATED INVESTMENT PUBLICATIONS
Securities regulators and other financial regulators regulate "investment advisors"
and not "newspapers."47 Even if traditional newspapers publish articles about
investment, they tend to be characterized as news stories rather than as investment
advice. Further, some investment information is news, and even entertainment.
However, some newspaper stories and columns may influence the behavior of
investors, and seem to be closer to advice as a result. It is even harder to draw the
line between advice and news online. Online newspapers and financial portals are
harder to distinguish than print newspapers and print tipsheets.48 In addition, online
financial portals may be run by newspapers. Both financial portals and online
newspapers contain articles about investment and advertisements that can link
readers directly to financial service providers. The financial service providers pay
the publishers for the advertisements. As a result, the publishers may have a
financial interest in their readers noticing the advertisements or even contracting
with the advertising firms.
The regulatory line between investment advice and newspapers relies on three
different distinctions: first, the distinction between general and specific information;
second, between personalized and general information; and, third, between
reputable and disreputable publishers. The purpose motivating publication of the
information may be relevant. If the publisher's motive is to sell newspapers, she is
not an investment adviser. On the other hand, if her purpose is to sell securities, she
may be considered an advisor.49 The United Kingdom's Financial Services
Authority has suggested that even impersonal advice might be considered giving
47. The U.S. Investment Advisers Act of 1940 defines an investment adviser as "any person who,
for compensation, engages in the business of advising others, either directly or through publications
or writings, as to the value of securities or as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling
securities, or who, for compensation and as part of a regular business, issues or promulgates analyses
or reports concerning securities." 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(1 1) (2000). Banks, broker-dealers, lawyers,
accountants, and teachers are all excluded from the definition as is: "the publisher of any bona fide
newspaper, news magazine or business or financial publication of general and regular circulation."
15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(I 1)(D). See also Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181,204 (1985) ("One of the statutory
exclusions is for 'the publisher of any bona fide newspaper, news magazine or business or financial
publication of general and regular circulation.' Although neither the text of the Act nor its legislative
history defines the precise scope of this exclusion, two points seem tolerably clear. Congress did not
intend to exclude publications that are distributed by investment advisers as a normal part of the
business of servicing their clients. The legislative history plainly demonstrates that Congress was
primarily interested in regulating the business of rendering personalized investment advice, including
publishing activities that are a normal incident thereto. On the other hand, Congress, plainly sensitive
to First Amendment concerns, wanted to make clear that it did not seek to regulate the press through
the licensing of nonpersonalized publishing activities.") (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(l 1)(D)).
48. See, e.g., Lowe, 472 U.S. at 203-12 (illustrating the complex analysis that is involved in
determining whether a distributed newsletter is excluded by statute).
49. Commercial speech may be subjected to a greater degree of regulation than non-commercial
speech. See, e.g., Commodity Trend Serv., Inc v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 149 F.3d 679,
686 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding publications were "not commercial speech" if they did "not propose a
commercial transaction between CTS and a specific customer"). Cf The Financial Services and




advice for commercial purposes."0 But the EU's Markets for Financial Instruments
Directive only applies to personal recommendations to a client." In the United
States, the provision of compensated impersonal advice has not been treated as an
activity requiring licensing.2 Also, when newspapers benefit from constitutional
protection from licensing, as they do in the United States, online services that do not
provide specific advice are likely to benefit from the same protection."
Courts and regulators are faced with issues about how to apply rules regulating
communications to online communications in many contexts beyond the sphere of
financial regulation. For example, the Federal Election Commission (FEC) recently
addressed the issue of when internet communications should be treated as "public
communications." "Public communications" is a term relevant both to issues of the
allocation of campaign funds and to requirements for disclaimers.54 In proposing
new regulations, the FEC stated:
The Commission's proposed rule attempts to strike a balance between provisions ofthe
Act that regulate "general public political advertising" and significant public policy
considerations that encourage the Internet as a forum for free or low-cost speech and
open information exchange. 5
The FEC raised the question whether bloggers should be expressly exempted from
the definition of public communications.56 Bloggers have strongly objected to this
proposal.57
50. Financial Services Authority, The Perimeter Guidance Manual, PERG 8.27.5 (Eng.),
available at http://fsahandbook.info/FSA/html/handbookiPERG/8/27. Impersonal advice has been
characterized as including circumstances where a newspaper gives advice in response to readers' letters
"to generate goodwill," or a website which generates income from advertising rather than from readers.
Financial Services Authority, Handbook, AUTH. 7.3.4 (Eng.) (revoked June 30, 2005), available at
http://fsahandbook.info/FSA/handbook.jsp?doc=/handbook/AUTH/7/3.
51. Council Directive No. 2004/39, Art. 4(4) O.J. L145/1, 10 (2004).
52. See, e.g., Taucher v. Born, 53 F. Supp. 2d 464, 482 (D.D.C. 1999) (holding the statute
requiring licensing of publishers of commodities trading advice to be unconstitutional as a prior
restraint on speech). Cf 17 C.F.R. § 4.14(a)(9) (exempting from licensing a person who does not
"(i) Direct [] client accounts; or (ii) Provid[e] commodity trading advice based on, or tailored to, the
commodity interest or cash market positions or other circumstances or characteristics of particular
clients").
53. See, e.g., Forsalebyowner.com Corp. v. Zinnemann, 347 F. Supp. 2d 868, 877 (E.D. Cal.
2004) ("FSBO's argument that Section 10026 unconstitutionally discriminates based on media type
is persuasive. The Court agrees that California's real estate licensing scheme impermissibly
differentiates between certain types of publications carrying the same basic content. As indicated
above, while Section 10026 exempts 'newspapers of general circulation' from the advance fee
provisions that trigger licensing requirement, websites like FSBO's are not so exempted. Given the
uncontroverted fact that FSBO's activities are virtually identical to those pursued online by California
newspapers, the distinction drawn between the two publishing mediums appears wholly arbitrary.").
54. Internet Communications, 70 Fed. Reg. 16,967, 16,969 (proposed Apr. 4, 2005) (to be
codified at 11 C.F.R. pts. 100, 110 & 114).
55. Id. at 16,969.
56. Id. at 16,971.
57. See, e.g., Duncan Black et al., Comments on Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: The Internet:
Definitions of "Public Communication " and "Generic Campaign Activity" and Disclaimers 6 (June
3, 2005), available at http://www.fec.gov/pdf/nprm/internetcomm/comm 09.pdf.
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Similarly, journalists have reacted negatively to the idea that they might be
expected to be licensed as investment advisers.58 Newspaper journalists also
emphasize that, unlike some contributors to online publications, they are subject to
codes of ethics.59 The existence of such self-regulatory schemes may protect
journalists from the obligation to be licensed even in jurisdictions where the press
is less protected than in the United States.
From the perspective of the investor who relies on negligent or reckless
information about trading strategies, the source of the advice may not seem relevant.
An investor might expect to have a remedy in relation to negligently published
information whether it were included in a broker-dealer's newsletter, on a website,
or in a newspaper.6" David McGowan pointed out that "[t]he reasons justifying
special treatment for media speakers rested largely on the traditionally high cost of
general publication."'"
Newspapers have changed with the development of communications technologies
and with new competitors. If online newspapers receive remuneration for linking
their readers to websites of financial services providers, perhaps they should be
required, at the very least, to publish disclaimers that they are not licensed providers
of investment advice.
V. PROFESSIONAL AND NON-PROFESSIONAL MARKET PARTICIPANTS
Professional occupations are typically distinguished from non-professional
occupations by both expertise and exclusion.62 Professionals have the legal right
to limit access to their profession and consequently command higher fees.63
Professionals can do this because they have persuaded legislators that the expertise
they possess can only be properly acquired under regulated conditions, and that the
58. See, e.g., Australian Press Council, Submission to the Parliamentary Joint Statutory
Committee on Corporations and Securities on the Financial Services Reform Bill 2001 (June 6,2001),
available at http://www.presscouncil.org.au/pcsite/fop/fopsubs/finance.html ("It is inappropriate for
the press to be burdened with a regulatory regime which would lead it to have to consider whether the
information that they propose to disseminate is financial product advice or to re-express that material
so that it eliminates the implication that it is financial product advice.").
59. See, e.g., Jane B. Singer, Who Are These Guys? The Online Challenge to the Notion of
Journalistic Professionalism, 4 JOURNALISM 139, 151-53 (2003).
60. Cf David McGowan, From Social Friction to Social Meaning: What Expressive Uses of
Code Tell Us About Free Speech, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1515, 1544 (2003) ("The content of a 'reference
guide' to collecting and cooking mushrooms is relatively particular and probably would strike most
readers as relatively verifiable, suggesting to them that they could rely on it in deciding what to eat.
If readers do not know that publishers are immune from liability for mistakes, then readers will not
adjust their level of reliance to take that immunity into account.").
61. Id. at 1558.
62. See, e.g., ELIOT FREIDSON, PROFESSIONALISM REBORN: THEORY PROPHECY AND POLICY 18
(1994) ("Gaining recognition as a 'profession' was important to occupations not only because it was
associated with traditional gentry status, but also because its traditional connotations of disinterested
dedication and learning legitimated the effort to gain protection from competition in the labor
market.").
63. These higher fees are sometimes characterized as "rents." See, e.g., HAROLD PERKIN, THE
RISE OF PROFESSIONAL SOCIETY: ENGLAND SINCE 1880, at 7 (1990).
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exercise of their professional activities is socially useful.' People who are not
properly licensed may be sanctioned for carrying out acts for which licensing is
required.6" Much of the literature on the professions focuses on how groups
succeed in claiming professional status and the impact of professional monopolies
on consumer welfare. In Europe, public authorities have acknowledged that
professional monopolies may, in some circumstances, need to be weakened in the
interests of consumers.66 If monopolisation means that professional services are
priced out of the reach of consumers, consumers will be harmed.67
One key distinction between professionals and non-professionals is that
professionals usually charge fees for performing professional services for their
clients while non-professionals do not charge for similar activities. Also, licensing
requirements usually apply to a person who is in the business of providing particular
professional services.6" This distinction between remunerated and unremunerated
services may also be used to determine which of a number of different regulatory
schemes applies to a person. Broker-dealers who do not receive separate
remuneration for the advice they give to investors are not required to register as
investment advisers.69 The SEC recently proposed regulations under which broker-
dealers who offer different types of accounts to clients, including execution-only
64. See, e.g., CCBE Response to the Clementi Consultation Document (June 4,2004), available
at http://www.ccbe.org/doc/En/ccbe-responseclementi_040604_en.pdf ("Lawyers have a vital role
in the administration of justice and in maintaining the rule of law, both of which are essential
foundations of a democratic society.").
65. For example, non-lawyers may be sanctioned for the unauthorized practice of law. See, e.g.,
Quintin Johnstone, Connecticut Unauthorized Practice Laws and Some Optionsfor Their Reform, 36
CONN. L. REV. 303, 313-14 (2004). An ABA Task Force has recommended applying a simplified
regulatory regime to finders (who often believe that they are not broker-dealers). Am. Bar Ass'n, ABA
Report and Recommendations ofthe Task Force on Private Placement Broker-Dealers (June 7,2005)
[hereinafter ABA Task Force], available at http://www.ibba.org/jiles/ABATaskForceReport6-2-05
.pdf.
66. See, e.g., lain Paterson et al., Economic Impact of Regulation in the Field of Liberal
Professions in Different Member States: Final Report-Part 1 (Jan. 2003), available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/publications/prof services/prof services_ihs_partl .pdf; DAVID
CLEMENTI, REPORT OF THE REVIEW OF THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR LEGAL SERVICES IN
ENGLAND AND WALES: FINAL REPORT (Dec. 2004) [hereinafter CLEMENTI REVIEW], available at
http://www.legal-services-review.org.uk/content/report/report-chap.pdf.
67. See, e.g., CLEMENTI REVIEW, supra note 66, at 6 ("The issue of costs is an important one:
high quality legal services are important to society, but of limited value if available only to the very
rich or those paid for by the State.").
68. Cf. ABA Task Force, supra note 65, at I ("Essentially ... any person who accepts 'transaction
based compensation,' i.e., commissions, for bringing capital to a third party securities issuer, must be
somehow registered to sell those securities through a member of the NASD."). In some circumstances,
a person may be sanctioned for providing professional services even if the services are not remunerated
to any significant extent. See, e.g., Ralph C. Cavanagh & Deborah Rhode, Unauthorized Practice of
Law and Pro Se Divorce, 86 YALE L.J. 104, 109 (1976) (stating costs for kits and personalized
assistance in document preparation in divorce cases as ranging in price from $3 to $180). Analysis of
the unauthorized practice of law tends to focus on the character of the services provided, rather than
on whether those services are remunerated as lawyers' services are. Cf Paul D. Healy, In Search of
the Delicate Balance: Legal and Ethical Questions in Assisting the Pro Se Patron, 90 LAW LIBR. J.
129, 129-30 (1998).
69. Investment Advisors Act of 1940, § 202(a)(1 1), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(1 1) (2000).
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accounts and full-service accounts, should not be treated as separately remunerated
for their advice for the purposes of the Investment Advisers Act.7"
In the information market, regulatory distinctions focus as much on where the
remuneration comes from as on whether or not an information provider receives
remuneration for their services at all. A person who publishes her opinions about
a particular securities issuer in a newspaper need not be licensed as a professional
investment advisor even though she is remunerated by the newspaper for doing so.
However, a person who publishes stock tips in an investment newsletter and charges
a fee will need to be licensed.7
Another key traditional distinction between professionals and non-professionals
is that professionals have expertise that others do not have. More precisely,
professionals are usually people who have been recognized by a professional
organization as having achieved the level of expertise necessary for entry into the
profession."
Securities law and regulation impose requirements on professionals that do not
apply to non-professional investors. Broker-dealers must establish that they have
the necessary expertise to act as brokers and dealers through examination. In
addition, they must establish that they satisfy an SRO's fitness requirements. If
they meet these conditions for authorization, broker-dealers are then subject to
ongoing obligations under SRO rules. Some of these SRO rules track legal
requirements that apply to market participants generally.73 Other SRO rules go
further. For example, one rule requires SRO members to behave according to "high
standards of commercial honor.
7 4
During the 1990s, a number of factors encouraged some investors to begin to
trade securities on a daily basis. These factors included easier and cheaper access
to real time information about trades in the financial markets, the stock market
boom, and the advertising of some broker-dealer firms.75 The trading strategies that
broker-dealer firms that promote day-trading advocate involve reacting to patterns
in trading activity.76
These new "day traders" traded for a living, but many of them were not classic
professional market participants." They often had no formal training in securities
70. Certain Broker-Dealers Deemed Not To Be Investment Advisers, 70 Fed. Reg. 20,424 (Apr.
19, 2005) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 275).
71. See, e.g., supra note 47.
72. See, e.g., NASD MANUAL (CCH), Rules 1014, 1031 (2005), available at
http://nasd.complinet.com/nasd/display/index.htm (Membership and Registration Rules).
73. Id. at Conduct Rule 2120 ("No member shall effect any transaction in, or induce the purchase
or sale of, any security by means of any manipulative, deceptive or other fraudulent device or
contrivance."). This language tracks the language of rule 1Ob-5. 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5.
74. NASD MANUAL, supra note 72, at Conduct Rule 2110.
75. LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM, OUTSMARTING THE SMART MONEY 225-27 (2002).
76. Id. at 226 ("Advertising lured day novices into day-trader classrooms, where newcomers were
taught not to care anything about the business whose stock they trade. Lessons focused on technical
trading strategies, the proven-to-be-impossible practice of predicting price movements from price
history and other data.").
77. NASD MANUAL, supra note 72, at Conduct Rule 2360(e) (defining a day trading strategy as
"an overall trading strategy characterized by the regular transmission by a customer of intra-day orders
to effect both purchase and sale transactions in the same security or securities."). The GAO has
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trading, and in many ways, they seemed more like customers than professional
securities dealers.7" Many day traders were, and still are, clients of broker-dealer
firms.79 Other day traders are employees of broker-dealer firms.
During the 1990s, some broker-dealer firms arranged their relationships with
their day traders differently. These firms made the traders principals of firms
structured as limited liability companies."0 If these firms held no customer accounts
and were members of an exchange, the firms were not required to become members
of the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD)."1 In addition to avoiding
the burdens of NASD controls, the firms and the traders who became principals in
those firms also discovered a mechanism for getting around the margin rules.
Margin regulation applies to loans to customers, and not to transactions by
principals using the firm's capital.82 The SEC decided not to accept the firms'
characterizations of their relationships with their day-trading principals. However,
the fact that the new day traders could be customers, employees, or principals of
broker-dealer firms may indicate more than that greedy broker-dealer firms were
trying to take advantage of vulnerable gamblers in whatever way they could. This
fact also illustrates that the distinction between professional and non-professional
market participants was beginning to blur.
In response to this blurring of distinctions between professionals and customers,
regulators reinforced the distinctions. The SEC and Congress worried that
vulnerable investors were losing money because of inappropriate trading
behaviour.8 3 Arthur Levitt, then Chairman of the SEC, described the new day
defined day trading as "consistently both buying and selling the same securities intraday via direct
access technology to take advantage of short-term price movements." U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
GAO-02-20, SECURITIES OPERATIONS: UPDATE ON ACTIONS TAKEN TO ADDRESS DAY TRADING
CONCERNS 4 (Nov. 27, 2001), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0220.pdf.
78. See Caroline Bradley, Disorderly Conduct: Day Traders and the Ideology of "Fair and
Orderly Markets," 26 J. CORP. L. 63, 63-64 (2000).
79. See, e.g., OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS AND EXAMINATIONS, SEC, REPORT OF
EXAMINATIONS OF DAY-TRADING BROKER-DEALERS, § IIIB (Feb. 25, 2000), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/daytrading.htm.
80. See id. § IV.A.
81. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b9-1. This exemption was designed
for exchange specialists. See, e.g., Arthur Levitt, Chairman of the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission, Testimony Before the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations Committee on
Governmental Affairs Concerning Day Trading (Sept. 16, 1999) [hereinafter Levitt Testimony],
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/testarchive/1999/tsty2199.htm ("Although this
exemption was intended primarily for exchange specialists, a number of day-trading firms are
organized as LLCs and are using this exemption as a means to maintain membership only in the Phlx.
About 12 to 15 day-trading firms are currently members only of the Phlx.").
82. See, e.g., Levitt Testimony, supra note 81 ("[Wlhen day-trading firms are organized as LLCs
and individual day traders contribute to the firm's capital, the day traders are permitted to trade using
the firm's capital. These LLC firms typically participate in joint back office ("JB0") arrangements,
which allow them to enhance their borrowing power. JBO arrangements have become popular because
they allow day-trading firms to receive preferential margin treatment from their clearing firms.
Specifically, a day-trading firm that participates in a JBO arrangement can receive credit from its JBO
clearing firm on 'good faith' terms. As a result, the customer margin requirements found in Regulation
T and SRO rules do not limit the extension of credit to a JBO participant. Rather, credit can be
extended for up to 100 percent of the purchase price of the securities.") (footnote omitted).
83. See Levitt Testimony, supra note 81.
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traders as gamblers," contrasting their behavior with the "speculative" behavior of
professional market participants. The Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
also characterized day trading as gambling."5
In response to the concerns of regulators and legislators, stock exchanges
required principals of their member firms to pass the General Securities
Representative Series 7 examination. 6 Traders claiming professional status should
establish that status by passing an examination. Also, vulnerable potential
customers of broker-dealers who tried to lure them into day trading should be
protected by risk disclosures emphasizing that day trading was risky. 7 Further,
NASD rules provide that firms which promote day trading strategies (directly or
indirectly) should provide risk disclosures to their prospective non-institutional
customers.88 In addition, they should only approve customers for day trading
accounts if they have "reasonable grounds for believing that the day-trading strategy
is appropriate for the customer." 9 NASD also requires a customer to have a
minimum of $25,000 equity in any day trading account.9 In 2001, the General
Accounting Office (GAO) found that day trading firms had responded to increased
regulatory scrutiny and were tending to emphasize the risks associated with day
trading.9' Exchanges amended their margin rules to prevent firms and traders using
business forms to avoid the consequences that would follow from the substance of
their relationships. For example, the Philadelphia Stock Exchange now applies the
margin rules to "margin accounts of customers, whether members, partners of
members, member organizations or stockholders therein or non-members.
9 2
84. See Levitt, supra note 6. Websites that promote online betting may also invoke the rhetoric
of professionalism: there are professional gamblers and non-professionals. See, e.g., Professional
Gambler.com, http://www.professionalgambler.com/ ("Sports betting as a business"). Gamblers can
also bet on the financial markets. Spread betting firms such as the IG Group provide a means for
people to bet on outcomes in the financial markets. See, e.g., IG Index, Binary Betting,
http://www.igindex.co.uk/content/so binary.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2005).
85. See Day Trading: Everyone Gambles But the House, Hearings before the Permanent
Subcomm. on Investigations of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, 106th Cong. 106-505 (2000).
86. See, e.g., Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 41,776 (Aug. 20, 1999),
64 Fed. Reg. 47,214 (Aug. 30, 1999); Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No.
41,881 (Sept. 17, 1999), 64 Fed. Reg. 51,822 (Sept. 24, 1999); Self-Regulatory Organizations,
Exchange Act Release No. 39,874 (Apr. 14, 1998), 63 Fed. Reg. 19,990 (Apr. 22, 1998).
87. See Order Approving Proposed Rule Change and Amendment No. 1 and Notice of Filing and
Order Granting Accelerated Approval of Amendment No. 2 Relating to the Opening of Day-Trading
Accounts, Exchange Act Release No. 43,021, 65 Fed. Reg. 44,082 (July 17, 2000). See also Notice
of Filing of Proposed Rule Change by the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., Relating
to Opening of Day-Trading Accounts, Exchange Act Release No. 41,875, 64 Fed. Reg. 51,165 (Sept.
21, 1999).
88. For the content of the risk disclosure statement, see NASD MANUAL, supra note 72, at
Conduct Rule 2361.
89. Id. at Conduct Rule 2360.
90. See, e.g., id. at Conduct Rule 2520(f)(8)(B)(iv)(a); NASD, Notice to Members 04-38, Credit
Extension/Day Trading Requirements (2004), available at http://www.nasd.com/web/groups/rules_
regs/documents/notice to members/nasdw 003091.pdf.
91. See U.S. GuN. ACCOUNTING OFFiCE, supra note 77, at 19.
92. Philadelphia Stock Exchange (PHLX), Inc., Rules of the Board of Governors, Rule 722(b),
available athttp://www.cchwallstreet.com/PhiladelphiaStockExchangePHLX/RULESOFTHEBOARD
OFGOVERNORS/default.asp (last visited Oct. 12, 2005).
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Although the day trading rules seek to maintain clear lines between professionals
and non-professionals, there is evidence that these lines are blurred. Day traders
continue to operate, and they continue to believe that they are operating on the basis
of expertise. They may not have clients who pay them for their professional
services, but this type of erosion of traditional distinctions does not only occur in
the financial markets. If new technologies encourage new working methods, it may
be necessary to revisit the idea that there is a connection between professional
activity and direct remuneration by a client. Programmers who collaborate on open
software are not paid for their collaboration, but they likely apply at least the same
standards of care to their work as they would if they were being remunerated
directly.93
Day traders are still trading. Moreover, day traders do not behave as we expect
"normal" non-professional investors to behave. In a number of recent cases, non-
day-trader investors have argued that day traders are not appropriate lead counsel
under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA)94 because they are not
"typical" investors and may be vulnerable to defences of non-reliance that would
not apply to other investors.9" If day traders are making investment decisions based
on market price trends, rather than on the basis of specific information disclosed to
the market by an issuer, they are not the typical fundamental value investor that
securities regulation assumes. On the other hand, in securities fraud cases, investors
are not required to prove that their investing decisions in fact took account of
misleading statements to the market, or the omission of material facts. In an
efficient market, the courts will allow investors to benefit from a presumption of
reliance, subject to the defendant's proof that the investor did not in fact rely on
material statements or omissions.96
The idea that day traders are professionals still lingers. Some broker-dealer firms
are encouraging people to become their clients as day traders, invoking the idea that
the traders are engaging in a quasi-professional activity." These firms buttress the
93. Barak Richman characterizes this activity as "professional" activity. Richman, supra note
25, at 2361 ("In the open software movement, however, programmers abide by a professional
community norm where participants do not demand direct compensation for their contributions."). On
what collaboration on open source software might mean for organization theory, see Benkler, supra
note 10. Benkler compares programmers to academics who participate in a professional enterprise of
generating knowledge without being remunerated for individual contributions. Id. at 381-82.
94. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3) (2000).
95. See, e.g., Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp. Retiree Med. Benefits Trust v. LaBranche & Co.,
[2004 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,839, at 93,916 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) ("Specifically,
CalPERS contends that Empire 'is a massive day-trading operation-using program trading to dart in
and out of NYSE stocks in small trades, thousands of times a day' ..., and that, as an in-and-out trading
entity, Empire is subject to unique defenses. Even assuming, arguendo, that Empire is either a
day-trading operation or an in-out trader, courts differ as to whether such entities may serve as a lead
plaintiff in a standard securities fraud class action involving alleged fraud on the market."); Taubenfeld
v. Career Educ. Corp., [2003-2004 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,715, at 93,443
(N.D. I11. 2004) ("Koontz and Margaritis attack Schroder's ability to serve as lead counsel on both
typicality and adequacy grounds. Concerning typicality, Koontz and Margaritis claim that Schroder
was a day trader, thereby making him atypical from the remaining members of the class and subject
to certain unique defenses.").
96. See, e.g., Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241-50 (1988).
97. See, e.g., Andrew Kezeli, Trade to Learn, Not to Earn..., PRISTINEVIEW, Summer/Fall 2004,
Winter 2006]
UNIVERSITY OF TOLEDO LAW REVIEW
idea of day trading as a professional activity by describing their training
programmes as "universities.""8 Broker-dealer firms are not alone in this; other
non-broker-dealer firms also describe themselves as trading universities.99
Although broker-dealers' advertising materials are subject to regulation by their
SRO,' it is not so clear that the same applies to non-broker-dealer firms' "training
programmes...... The SEC warns day traders that educational seminars and books
about day trading may not be objective. 102 When regulated broker-dealers make
specific claims about the profits their clients will make from day trading, they may
be subject to sanction." 3 In the same way that general news articles are not treated
as investment advice, generalized advice about trading strategies, in particular
where that advice originates from firms that are not otherwise regulated as broker-
dealers or investment advisers, may avoid regulatory controls.
Characterising day trading as a "professional" activity, as daytrading firms do, 04
responds to the concerns of those who worry that day traders may not understand
that when they trade, they are competing in the markets with professional traders
and institutional investors15 who have greater financial and experiential resources.
At the same time, the "professional" rhetoric may encourage prospective traders to
be over-confident and to discount day trading risk warnings. These over-confident
at 3 (copy on file with author); Andrew Kezeli, Avoiding the Trading-in-Isolation Trap, PRISTINE
VIEw, Winter/Spring 2005, at 16, 17, available at http://www2.pristine.com/PristineView/archive/
PristineViewWinter2005.pdf ("Trading is a profession and at all times I want to treat it as such--even
down to my morning 'commute,' the walk downstairs.").
98. See, e.g., PRISTINE VIEW, Winter/Spring 2005, at 14 (advertising the Pristine Trading
University), available at http://www2.pristine.com/PristineView/archive/PristineViewWinter2005.pdf.
99. See, e.g., Daytrading University, http://www.daytrading-university.com/ ("Disclosure: We
are not an investment advisor, financial planner or registered broker. We provide realtime market
analysis and educational services for active traders. You accept all liability resulting from your trading
decisions. Daytrading is a speculative, high risk activity and is not suitable for many investors.").
100. See NASD MANUAL, supra note 72, at Conduct Rule 2210. For disciplinary proceedings
involving this rule, see NASD Regulation, Inc., Office of Hearing Officers, Dep't of Enforcement v.
Pac. On-line Trading & Sec., Inc., Disciplinary Proceeding No. CO 1000037 (Dec. 7, 2001), available
at http://www.nasd.com/web/groups/enforcement/documents/oho-discipinary-decisions/nasdw-00
658 l.pdf; NASD Regulation, Inc., Office of Hearing Officers, Dep't of Enforcement v. Ellen M.
Aleshire, Disciplinary Proceeding No. C8A010060 (June 12, 2002), available at
http://www.nasd.com/web/groups/enforcement/documents/oho-disciplinarydecisions/nasdw_006
565.pdf.
101. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SECURriES OPERATIONS, DAY TRADING REQUIRES
CONTINUED OVERSIGHT 21 (Feb. 24,2000), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/gg00061.pdf
("SEC has also stated that it is concerned about Web sites that, although not operated by day trading
firms, are trying to capitalize on day trading. Many of these sites appear to advertise the potential
rewards of day trading by use of the sites' recommendation. SEC said it is looking into whether these
sites are violating the federal securities laws."). Cf Taucher v. Born, 53 F. Supp. 2d 464, 482 (D.D.C.
1999) (holding the statute requiring licensing of publishers of commodities trading advice to be
unconstitutional as a prior restraint on speech).
102. SEC, Day Trading: Your Dollars at Risk (Apr. 20,2005), http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/
daytips.htm.
103. See, e.g., Press Release, NASD, NASD Regulation Charges All-Tech, Houtkin, and Others
with Day Trading and Advertising Violations (July 17, 2000), available at
http://www.nasd.com/web/idcplg?IdcService-SS_GETPAGE&ssDocName=NASDW_011401.
104. See Kezeli, supra note 97.
105. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 101, at 3.
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prospective traders may have no trouble persuading a broker-dealer firm that day
trading is a suitable investment strategy for them.
Day traders may be an extreme example of self-directed investors. But they are
a useful illustration of how a combination of technological change, successful
marketing, and entrepreneurial ambition can combine to challenge regulatory
distinctions.
VI. SOPHISTICATED AND UNSOPHISTICATED MARKET PARTICIPANTS
Day traders are not the only investors whose conceptions of who they are are
altered by technology. Day traders choose to engage with the new market for
financial information, but other investors need to use the new information market
because of other factors beyond their control. For example, changes in pension
arrangements from defined benefit to defined contribution schemes mean that large
numbers ofworkers rely on their investment decisions for their retirement.'l 6 Social
security privatisation would increase the number of people who would need to begin
making more complicated investment decisions. In making these decisions,
investors can rely on a range of different (and differently regulated) intermediaries,
ranging from investment advisers to mutual funds to broker-dealers. Investors may
decide to obtain some information from unregulated sources such as investment
clubs,0 7 online chat rooms, and unregulated online and offline publications.
The investor who knows that she needs help in making investment decisions
benefits from some regulatory protections. For example, broker-dealers are
required to assess whether the investments and investment strategies they
recommend to their clients are suitable for the clients.' In making this
determination, the broker-dealer is required to take into account the customer's
financial condition and investment objectives.' 9 As with all financial regulation,
there are problems with enforcement of the rules. Regulators sometimes express
concern that financial firms are not as careful as they might be in their assessments
of customers' experience and understanding. 0
106. Cf FINANCL SERVICES AUTHORITY, PENSIONS: CHALLENGES AND CHOICES: THE FIRST
REPORT OF THE PENSIONS COMMISSION 11 (Jan. 2005), available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/pensions/pensions-reportl.pdf ("Helping people access the education,
information and advice which they need in order to make appropriate financial decisions with
confidence is central to the FSA's aims of protecting consumers, promoting public awareness of the
financial system and maintaining market confidence. We provide a wide range of consumer materials
and tools, including a consumer website, comparative tables (including a pensions table and an
annuities table), an on-line pensions calculator and consumer leaflets."). See also, e.g., Jeffrey J.
Bailey et al., A Review ofMajor Influences on Employee Retirement Investment Decisions, 23 J. OFFIN.
SERVICES RES. 149, 149-65 (2003) (summarizing four sets of social influences "so that researchers and
policy makers can better understand all the influences affecting an employee when making retirement
plan contribution and investment decisions").
107. See, e.g., National Association of Investors Corporation (NAIC),
http://www.better-investing.org/index.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2005).
108. See, e.g., NASD MANUAL, supra note 72, at Conduct Rule 2310; text accompanying supra
note 89.
109. Id.
110. See, e.g., FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, EQUITY CONTRACTS FOR DIFFERENCE (CFDs)
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Another investor may decide that he does not need to consult a broker in making
his investment decisions. He may have lost trust in financial firms as a result of
market scandals."' He may think that he can make investment choices on his own
and can take advantage of the lower fees brokers charge for non-discretionary
accounts. In this case, the broker will generally not be assessing the suitability of
the investor's investments, as brokers usually do not have duties to monitor their
clients' non-discretionary accounts. After an investment goes badly, a customer
may argue that he is less sophisticated than he originally seemed." 2 An investor's
ultimate assessment of an investment opportunity may differ dramatically from that
same investor's initial assessment of the same opportunity. Unless the broker-
dealer encourages the investor to adopt a particular investment strategy or
guarantees the performance of the investment in some way, there is no basis for
arguing that the investor should not bear responsibility for his own decision.
Brokers who promote day-trading strategies have an obligation to make sure they
only open day trading accounts for customers for whom day trading is suitable.
However, it is unclear to what extent this enhanced suitability obligation extends
to other investment strategies," 3 in particular where the investors decide on
particular investment strategies as a result of information they obtain from sources
other than the broker.
Increased availability of information about investments and investment strategies
may encourage some investors to characterize themselves to their brokers as more
sophisticated than they actually are. Some investors may decide to open non-
discretionary accounts rather than discretionary accounts because they trust their
own ability to make investment decisions. Some investors who feel most
empowered, such as some online day traders" 4 and members of investment clubs,"'
AND SPREAD BETTING THEMATIC PROJECT (May 18, 2005), available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/cfdsletter.pdf.
111. See, e.g., Organisation for Economics Cooperation and Development (OECD), OECD's
Financial Education Project: Background and Implementation, 87 FIN. MARKETTRENDS 223,226 (Oct.
2004), available athttp://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/28/36/33865427.pdf("[C]onsumers... may distrust
financial institutions and anything to do with them.")
112. See, e.g., De Kwiatkowski v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 306 F.3d 1293, 1302 (2d Cir. 2002) ("It
is uncontested that a broker ordinarily has no duty to monitor a nondiscretionary account, or to give
advice to such a customer on an ongoing basis. The broker's duties ordinarily end after each
transaction is done, and thus do not include a duty to offer unsolicited information, advice, or warnings
concerning the customer's investments. A nondiscretionary customer by definition keeps control over
the account and has full responsibility for trading decisions. On a transaction-by-transaction basis, the
broker owes duties of diligence and competence in executing the client's trade orders, and is obliged
to give honest and complete information when recommending a purchase or sale. The client may enjoy
the broker's advice and recommendations with respect to a given trade, but has no legal claim on the
broker's ongoing attention.").
113. But see, e.g., NASD, Notice to Members 04-89, Liquefied Home Equity 3 (Dec. 2004),
available at http://www.nasd.com/web/groups/rules-regs/documents/notice-to-members/nasdw_01
2714.pdf.
114. See, e.g., Barber & Odean, supra note 45.
115. See, e.g., Brad M. Barber & Terrance Odean, Too Many Cooks Spoil the Profits: Investment
Club Performance, FIN. ANALYSTS J. 17 (Jan./Feb. 2000), available at
http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/odean/papers/clubs/FAJ%20JF00%20Barber/o2Oand%200dean.pd
f#search='barber/o20and%20odean ' (finding that investment clubs tended to underperform the market).
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may in fact be much more vulnerable than they realize. Experience makes a
difference in how investors behave."
6
Increasingly, financial regulators are focusing on the problem of how to help
investors sort and analyse the information available to them.' This leads
regulators to suggest that disclosure requirements may need to be rethought."'
Regulators, trade associations, 1"' and inter-governmental organisations are
promoting investor education initiatives. 20 For example, Congress established the
Financial Literacy and Education Commission to improve financial literacy in the
United States, and to coordinate the actions of agencies interested in financial
literacy.' 2' Individual agencies also dedicate resources to promoting financial
education; for example, the SEC has an Office of Investor Education and
Assistance. 2 2 Also, central banks are using online games to educate people about
monetary policy.1'2 For investors who are already online, these information
resources are easily accessible. And for the careful investor who wants to know
116. Lo & Repin, supra note 42, at 329 ("The differences in response patterns for deviations and
trend-reversals observed in this case indicate that less experienced traders may be more sensitive to
short-term changes in the market variables than their more experienced colleagues.").
117. See, e.g., James Fanto, We're All Capitalists Now: The Importance, Nature, Provision and
Regulation ofInvestor Education, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 105, 108 (1998). But see Hu, supra note
20. The U.K.'s Department for International Development has even set up a website at
http://www.sendmoneyhome.org/, which allows people to compare the costs of different methods of
sending remittances home. See Dep't for Int'l Dev., Sending Money Home? A Survey of Remittance
Products and Services in the United Kingdom (Mar. 31, 2005), available at
http://www.sendmoneyhome.org/NewFiles/Full%2Oreport.pdf.
118. See, e.g., Julie L. Williams, Acting Comptroller of the Currency, Remarks Before Women
in Housing and Finance and The Exchequer Club, Washington, D.C. (Jan. 12, 2005), available at
http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/2005- 1 a.pdf("There's a critical element that's been missing from
our consumer disclosure rulemaking processes-testing how consumers interpret particular disclosures
and how to make disclosures usable to them. And we also need to think about how we can build in
periodic reviews to determine if the disclosures are still desired and effective.").
119. In the United Kingdom, the Institute of Financial Studies has developed programs to educate
students aged from 14 to 19 in financial studies. See http://www.ifslearning.con/qualifications/age_
14_-_19/index.cfm. See also Annual Report & Accounts of the Chartered Institute of Bankers,
January-December 2004, at 3, available at http://www.ifslearning.com/institute/annual report_2004/
annualreport2004.pdf ("During 2004 the if' financial capability qualifications for schools, the only
ones of their kind throughout the UK, were given a considerable boost when the Certificate in
Financial Studies (CeFS) was awarded the full UCAS tariff for university admissions. Our
qualifications are now on a par with all the others offered throughout the schools and colleges sector
as pathways to a university education. This represents yet another first for the i.").
120. See, e.g., OECD, Financial Education Project, supra note 111, at 223.
121. See Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 § 513, Pub. L. No. 108-159
(amending Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681). See also Financial Literacy and Education
Commission, http://www.mymoney.gov/ (offering financial information).
122. See U.S. SEC, Investor Information, http://www.sec.gov/investor.shtml.
123. See, e.g., Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Peanuts and Crackerjacks,
http://www.bos.frb.org/peanuts/leadpgs/intro.htm; Bank of Finland, Rahamuseo,
http://www.rahamuseo.fienglish/multi-politiikka.html; Deutsche Bundesbank, School Service,
http://www.bundesbank.de/bildung/bildung.en.php; Reserve Bank of New Zealand, MoPoS,
http://www.rbnz.govt.nz/education/0116902.html.
Winter 2006]
UNIVERSITY OF TOLEDO LAW REVIEW
how to check on a broker or adviser she is thinking of hiring, the SEC offers several
suggestions.'24
Numerous private sector initiatives also focus on investor education and training.
Some of these resources encourage caution. As an illustration, the Motley Fool
provides access to information about a wide range of different issues from choosing
a broker to budgeting.'25 In addition, StockPatrol.com publishes reports on issuers
and links to announcements by regulators and news stories about investing.'26 Other
private sector education resources are less inclined to promote caution. Daytrading
firms' websites seek to educate people in day trading strategies.'27 Private investor
training programmes raise many of the same issues that investment advisor
regulation and anti-fraud rules seek to address. Specifically, how can investors be
sure that the training programmes, including software and (online and offline)
courses, they pay for are in fact worth the money?' Moreover, should the business
of investor education be regulated? The North American Securities Administrators
Association (NASAA) regularly includes investment seminars in its list of top
threats to investors.
129
However, focusing on regulating the firms that seek to educate investors is
perhaps not the most effective way of ensuring that people are able to manage their
money. Instead, we should focus more attention on educating investors, notjust on
educating those who seek out reliable sources for their information. Because
financial services firms have started to build financial relationships with children,
financial education must begin early. 3 ° Children can have prepaid credit cards,''
and firms use educational resources to develop relationships with young people that
may become profitable later.'32 A serious investor education programme would
require people to pass an exam before they may invest or before being allowed to
invest in other than very basic ways.'33
124. SEC, Protect Your Money: Check Out Brokers and Advisers,
http://www.sec.gov/investor/brokers.htm.
125. See The Motley Fool, http://www.fool.com/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2005).
126. See, e.g., StockPatrol.com, http://www.stockpatrol.com/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2005).
127. See, e.g., TerraNovaOnline at http://www.terranovaonline.com/TNOEDU/HomeEDU.asp
(last visited Dec. 8, 2005).
128. James Fanto notes that investor education in the United States is "a market commodity
supplied by a bewildering number of providers, both profit-making, nonprofit and even governmental,
who offer it to different kinds of people (e.g., children, adults, sophisticated, unsophisticated) in
different ways." James A. Fanto, Comparative Investor Education, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 1083, 1100
(1998).
129. See, e.g., NASAA, supra note 31. Investment seminars did not make this top 10 list for 2005
but were given a "dishonorable mention." Id.
130. Cf Fanto, supra note 128, at 1100 ("The U.S. educational system generally provides investor
education to young people but not in a standardized way. Its provision varies from state to state, often
appearing in a basic economic or finance class or in a revised home economics course.").
131. One example is the AllowCard, described at http://www.allowcard.com/ ("A new way to pay.
It's called the Allow Card-and it's changing the relationship between children and parents, building
a strong foundation of trust, understanding, financial freedom and responsibility.").
132. Columbia Funds has an educational website geared to children and young people, including
games, and information about mutual funds. Columbia Funds, YoungInvestor,
http://www.younginvestor.con/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2005).




Regulatory distinctions incorporate implicit, as well as explicit, understandings
of technological conditions. This article argues that three distinctions at the heart
of current securities regulation in particular are challenged by technological
development. It is increasingly difficult to distinguish between traditional news
sources and regulated investment publications, between professional and non-
professional market participants, and between sophisticated and unsophisticated
investors. Changing patterns of information-gathering and decision-making by
investors require revisiting core assumptions of securities law; specifically, the
assumptions that only rational investors deserve statutory protections; that
impersonal trading advice is not "investment advice"; and, that it is easy to
distinguish between professional and non-professional and sophisticated and
unsophisticated investors.
The changing world in which online investors are operating raises real questions
about whether traditional securities regulation can effectively protect investors.
Although legislators and regulators are building resources for educating investors
for the financial decisions they need to make, non-governmental entities are actively
involved in educating and training investors as well. Investors who take advantage
of all of the informational resources available to them are likely to believe that they
are empowered investors. However, the investors who believe in their own
empowerment may, in fact, be vulnerable to being misled and cheated by those who
have trained them.
L. REv. 279, 311 (2000).
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